Thursday, 26 September 2013
Dealing with al-Shabaab operations in Kenya is not a question of counter-terrorism, it is a question of Kenya itself
The UK, the US,
Germany, Canada and Interpol have begun assisting Kenya’s investigation into
the recent attack on the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi, where 61
civilians have been killed in a ruthless assault and subsequent hostage
situation. This active support comes in the wake of international pledges of assistance
to the Kenyan security services while the siege was underway.
With numerous
individuals from France, the UK and the US having been caught up in the attack,
there is the general impression that terrorism in Kenya is a question of
international conflict. While it is true this atrocity has been claimed by al-Shabaab
to be a response to the occupation of Kenyan forces in Somalia, the attack on
the Westgate shopping centre comes as part of a long line of terrorist activity
in the region that predates Kenya’s 2011 invasion of Somalia.
As we try to come
to terms with the catastrophe that has befallen Kenya, we need to think hard
about the nature of the threat and what the best response might be. This means,
first of all, understanding that Kenya and Somalia are intimately connected.
Two percent of
the Kenyan population is ethnically Somali—living in, and enjoying, Kenyan
citizenship. Are we 2% actually? The “Somali” peoples have been spread across territory that is now
Kenyan since 1885 when Ogaden Somalis broke the power of the Orma tribe. The
jagged line in the map below shows the part of Kenya heavily populated by those
of Somali ethnicity.
While in the
1960s, division between Kenya and Somalia was one of territory, it has now become
extra-territorial. However, any such terrorist activity predates Kenya’s 2011
military entrance into Somalia. The earliest case of terrorist activity in
Kenya similar to what we have witnessed in these past few days was the bombing
of a Jewish-owned hotel on New Year’s Eve in 1980. The Nairobi hotel was
targeted by a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. (Note
the similarities with the Westgate shopping centre which has also been targeted
for being Jewish-owned.)
The most
significant terrorist incident in the region, however, was when al-Qaeda
conducted twin bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)
in 1998. The attack in Tanzania led to 11 deaths and in Kenya to 213 deaths.
This brought to the attention of the US administration al-Qaeda’s ability to
organise large and devastating operations long before 9/11, and helps explain
their ongoing interest in all terrorist developments in East Africa.
The fact of a long
list of precedents demonstrates how the sad events we have witnessed in the
Westgate shopping centre have not come out of the blue.
The common
impression is that al-Shabaab, which is formally allied to al-Qaeda, is acting
in response to Kenya’s 2011 invasion. That is certainly what al-Shabaab has
been tweeting. The truth is that the Kenyan military entered Somalia only after
al-Shabaab militants crossed the border into Kenya to kidnap and attack aid
workers of the Dadaab refugee camp. The camp, which is the largest refugee camp
in the world, hosts those who have fled violence and famine in Somalia. Kenya
acted in response to a developing situation that was brought about by al-Shabaab’s
misuse of the southern Somali peoples.
It is important,
therefore, to note two things about the current al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda threat. The
first is that al-Shabaab’s political justification for the atrocity conducted
in the shopping centre carries no weight. In some ways the Westgate attack is
similar to the multiple bombings carried out in 2010 by al-Shabaab in Kampala,
Uganda, which killed 74. While it may be true that in both the Kampala and Westgate
attacks al-Shabaab acted in opposition to each country’s military occupation of
Somalia, the reality is that in both cases likely-international targets were
chosen. Members of al-Shabaab hold an ideological and strategic commitment to
target Israeli, US and European persons. They seek international attention, and
support for a supposed global Jihad. Whether Kenya has forces in Somalia or not
is an important but insufficient reason the terrorist networks act in this way.
Indeed, such is the desire for international attention, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda
care little for whether East African Muslims are killed in the process.
The second point
to note is that fighting al-Shabaab is not a question of strengthening counter-terrorism
or security personnel. While it is understandable that foreign governments wish
to pledge support for Kenya’s security forces, this is not something that can help
anything more than short-term reactions to atrocities. The border between Kenya
and Somalia is 682 kilometres long, a straight line drawn in the dust. Since
even before the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalis have sought
refuge in Kenya and other countries, rendering their population arguably the
most extra-territorially networked in East Africa. This has led to both the “ups”
of economically booming mini-cities such as Eastleigh in Nairobi, and the “downs”
of an ever-enduring refugee crisis. The graph below shows total numbers of
refugees in Kenya over a 15-year period according to UNHCR, and the proportion that
have come from Somalia. The number of Somali refugees in Kenya has fluctuated
just below a quarter of a million, which means it is ludicrous to imagine that tightening
border-crossing checkpoints will inhibit a determined terrorist network.
Responding to
the terror threat requires a winning of hearts and minds among both Somali
refugees and existing Kenyan nationals of Somali ethnicity. Kenya has been
independent for 50 years but Somalis have lived in Kenya for 128 years—this is something
that must be recognised by both Kenyans and the international community. Experience
testifies to how beating local terrorist cells is only achieved when local residents
have reason to trust the police. That is, unfortunately, not something most ordinary
Kenyans feel they can do, let alone those living in Kenya illegally or as refugees.
The fates of Kenya
and Somalia are inextricably tied. Any policies that come out of evaluating the
Westgate attack need to remember this. So long as in Somalia there is periodic famine
and constant violence, and in Kenya a state that rewards the rich of certain tribes,
the threat of political frustrations leading to terrorism will sadly endure
from within Kenya’s borders.
